Vote No. 117

April 30, 1998, 10:25 pm Page S-3907 Temp. Record

NATO EXPANSION/Ratification

SUBJECT: Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic . . . Treaty Document 105-36. Ratification.

ACTION: RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION AGREED TO, 80-19

SYNOPSIS: Treaty Document 105-36, the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, will give the Senate's advice and consent to admitting those countries as full members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Details are provided below.

DECLARATIONS (nonbinding statements on issues raised by the treaty)

- Membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.
- Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will serve NATO and United States national security interests by deterring aggressors and by increasing stability, both for those countries and for current NATO members.
- The North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of NATO, it has direct responsibilities for matters relating to NATO policies, and its decisions do not require the consent of any other international organization.
- The new members will have full NATO rights and responsibilities, and the Senate endorses the nonbinding political commitment made to Russia not to deploy nuclear weapons or station forces on the territory of these countries.
 - It is in the United States' interest to develop a new and constructive relationship with Russia.
- It is the sense of the Senate: that the central purpose of NATO is to provide for the collective defense of its members; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an essential forum for the discussion and resolution of political disputes; and the European Union (EU) is an essential organization for integrating Europe. It is the policy of the United States to utilize fully the OCSE and to encourage the EU to expand.
- The NATO treaty allows any European state in a position to further the principles of NATO and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to be invited to join NATO; NATO has an open-door policy for new members who satisfy the

YEAS (80)				NAYS (19)		NOT VOTING (1)	
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(45 of Abraham Allard Bennett Bond Brownback Burns Campbell Chafee Coats Cochran Collins Coverdell D'Amato DeWine Domenici Enzi Faircloth Frist Gorton Gramm Gramm Gramm Grams Grams Grassley Gregg	Hagel Hatch Helms Hutchison Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Roberts Roth Santorum Sessions Shelby Smith, Gordon Snowe Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond	Akaka Baucus Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Byrd Cleland Daschle Dodd Durbin Feingold Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Hollings Inouye	Johnson Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Murray Reed Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Torricelli	(9 or 17%) Ashcroft Craig Hutchinson Inhofe Jeffords Kempthorne Smith, Bob Specter Warner	Bryan Bumpers Conrad Dorgan Harkin Leahy Moynihan Reid Wellstone Wyden	EXPLANAT 1—Official F 2—Necessar 3—Illness 4—Other SYMBOLS: AY—Annou AN—Annou PY—Paired PN—Paired	ily Absent nced Yea nced Nay Yea

VOTE NO. 117 APRIL 30, 1998

requirements for membership; the United States has not consented or committed to invite any countries other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; and the Senate will not support accession or an invitation to begin accession talks unless the President consults with the Senate beforehand and unless the addition, as well as meeting membership requirements, will meet overall political and strategic interests of the United States and NATO.

- No action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each NATO member (in the case of the United States, including the Senate's advice and consent power on making treaties), will constitute a security commitment.
- The Partnership for Peace (between NATO members and some of the former Warsaw Pact countries) is an important and enduring complement to NATO that maintains and enhances regional security by promoting common objectives; NATO has taken steps to strengthen the Partnership for Peace; the Partnership for Peace promotes the security of the United States; accession of new members to NATO must not undermine the Partnership for Peace; and membership in the Partnership does not prejudice prospective NATO membership.
- The United States, in discussions with formerly communist countries, should raise the issue of paying insurance benefits to victims of Nazis that were not paid when foreign insurance companies were nationalized and their assets seized.

CONDITIONS (conditions are requirements placed on the President by the Senate as part of the Senate's advice and consent to ratification; they are binding on the United States but not on other treaty signatories)

- 1) The core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO remain valid, and the upcoming revision of that document will reflect certain principles (for a list of those principles, see vote No. 107). The Senate declares that the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members, and that NATO may, "on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members." The Senate declares that NATO must continue to pursue defense planning, command structures, and force goals to meet the collective defense requirement. The President will be required to submit a report on the Strategic Concept within 180 days and at least two briefings will be given to the Senate on proposals to revise the Strategic Concept.
- 2) Before depositing the instrument of ratification, the President will certify: that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will not increase the overall percentage share of the United States in the common budgets of NATO; that the United States is under no commitment to subsidize those countries' national expenses relative to NATO; and that the inclusion of those countries will not detract from the ability of the United States to meet or to fund its military requirements outside of the North Atlantic area. Annual reports on costs, burdensharing, and the status of discussions concerning adding new members will be prepared. It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose to reduce its percentage of the common NATO budgets by 1 percent per year through fiscal year (FY) 2003 (it currently pays 25 percent). Unless specifically authorized by law, the United States will not pay more to the common budgets than it paid in FY 1998. Before any additional country is invited to join NATO, the President will prepare a detailed report on that proposed addition.
- 3) Prior to the deposit of the instrument of ratification, the President will certify that the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council created by that Act do not provide the Russian Federation with a veto or decision-making authority over NATO policy. The Permanent Joint Council will not be used as a forum for negotiating or deciding NATO's basic strategy, doctrine, or readiness, nor will it be used as a substitute for arms control negotiations. Discussions will be explanatory only, and will not compromise NATO's effectiveness. NATO will not discuss any agenda item with Russia prior to agreeing to a NATO position on that agenda item.
 - 4) Intelligence reports relating to the accession of these countries will be prepared for the congressional intelligence committees.
- 5) Prior to depositing the instrument of ratification, the President will certify that the governments of these countries are fully cooperating with efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel (see vote No. 108).
- 6) The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in the resolution of ratification for the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Nothing in that treaty will be construed as authorizing the President to obtain legislative approval for modifications or amendments to treaties through majority approval of both Houses of Congress.

Those favoring ratification contended:

We have a historic window of opportunity to take steps which will secure European peace and stability and which will lock in the freedom and independence won by the collapse of the Soviet Empire. By expanding NATO, we will both bring stability to the new members, increase the stability of their neighbors, and greatly lessen the chance of another world war.

Twice this century the United States has had to fight enormous, bloody wars in Europe to defend its vital interests. After World War II, an artificial dividing line was cut through Europe that allowed the communist Soviets to hold captive those Eastern European nations that it held at the end of the war. The free nations of Western Europe then joined with the United States in a defensive military alliance, NATO, against the real threat of invasion. Those NATO members still had their differences, but they put them

APRIL 30, 1998 VOTE NO. 117

aside to meet the greater need of survival. By working together cooperatively on defense, good will grew which lessened old animosities. NATO, more than anything else in history, has brought peace and unity to Western Europe.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries have been struggling to recover from communist domination. However, not all of the citizens of these countries embrace western values; not all of them wish to settle their disputes with their neighbors peacefully; not all of them are willing to make painful, though necessary, economic reforms. Some countries are making better progress than others. Despite the differences within the countries, there is one point on which most of their citizens agree--they wish to become part of the NATO alliance. Russia may be in a state of disarray at present, but it is still a huge land with a large population and ample natural resources. It will be powerful again. Eastern European countries do not want to be left in limbo waiting for that day. Russia may develop peacefully, and have open and non-coercive relations with its neighbors, or it may follow historical practice by attempting to dominate or conquer its neighbors. NATO membership may be extended to any European nation, but will only be extended to European nations under certain conditions--they must be democratic, they must operate under the rule of law, they must have a civilian-controlled military that can operate with and contribute to NATO, they must have economic and personal freedoms, and they must settle their disputes with their neighbors peacefully. The desire for NATO membership has greatly sped the process of democratization and the settlement of disputes in Eastern Europe.

No one has denied that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made the political and economic reforms that should be required to join NATO, but some have questioned whether they will be able to shoulder their fair share of the burden, and have suggested that United States will have to assume huge new costs. We do not share this concern. Our colleagues have misinterpreted some of the estimates that have been made of the projected costs. The reality is that there is broad agreement among military experts that the commitment required of the United States by approval of this treaty will be relatively minor. In fact, many experts believe that these countries are making such great defense efforts that in a few years they will have better forces than many current NATO members. Further, though these countries are not yet members of NATO, they are in Bosnia now, and in the recent showdown with Hussein, when some of our NATO allies vacillated, they all pledged military support. The United States has approximately 100,000 active duty forces in Europe; these three countries have 200,000 active duty personnel, all of whom are in Europe.

Another major concern of many Senators who oppose this treaty is that it will cause increased militarism in Russia. We believe that the opposite is true. Expanding NATO to include Eastern Europe will remove the possibility that Russia will be able to dominate it by force. Militaristic forces in Russia who hope to rebuild the Soviet Empire will thus be unable to win support from the general population, because Russians will know those forces are pursuing an impossible cause. Expanding NATO will help democratic, free-market reformers in Russia pursue their agenda by making a militaristic agenda impossible. Additionally, Russia-United States cooperation has been expanding at the same time as the NATO expansion process has been moving forward.

Though there is general agreement among this treaty's supporters that NATO may have to take action outside of the borders of its members, there is not much agreement on the size of the threat that should prompt such action. Some Senators, and the Clinton Administration, tend toward the view that NATO ought to be involved in "peacekeeping" operations around the world even when the threats to European stability are fairly remote; other Senators who support this treaty believe very strongly that it should only take action outside of its territory when the threat is huge and imminent. The consensus view among the treaty's supporters is that NATO allies, in each situation, will be able to determine NATO's role. The treaty itself, and this resolution, do not commit the countries to anything more than their territorial defense.

The admission of these three countries has been given very careful consideration. It has been 9 years since the Berlin Wall came down, yet to date no new nations have been added. Reforms have been demanded first. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held 12 hearings over the past 4 years on the subject. Last year, the Senate created the NATO enlargement group which included 28 Senators. That group has held 17 meetings with Administration officials as well as with political and military leaders from Europe. More than half of all Senators have been involved in hearings and negotiations on the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and in determining the terms of that admission. The Senate has not given a rubberstamp to the Clinton Administration's proposal—it has spent 9 months revising the proposed resolution of ratification to make it acceptable. Numerous declarations and binding conditions have been added.

The admission of these three countries has been endorsed by all living former Secretaries of State, by numerous former Secretaries of Defense and national security advisors, and more than sixty flag officers and general officers, including five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Approving this treaty will turn a new page of peace in Europe's history. It will cement the triumph of freedom and democracy, and will strengthen the NATO alliance to the clear advantage of Europe and America. We are honored to have the opportunity to vote in favor of ratification.

Those opposing ratification contended:

Argument 1:

Ratifying this treaty will appear to be a hostile act to Russia, and we frankly believe that it will be right to have that view. Our

VOTE NO. 117 APRIL 30, 1998

colleagues talk about how this treaty will help calm and unify Europe, and about how they do not intend any threat to Russia. They are quite right on all scores--it will be helpful in Europe, and they do not intend to threaten Russia. However, those facts are not what is important to this debate. The important fact is that expanding NATO will threaten Russia, whether intentionally or not, and will harm Russia's security. Russia is in a very unstable situation at present. It could easily suffer further disintegration and civil warfare. It is under tremendous pressure internally, and faces some external threats as well, such as in its southern oil regions. Pushing the borders of NATO, which was its military Cold War enemy, toward its current nearly defenseless border, is a hostile expansion, because it is an expression of distrust. Russians will see it, correctly, as an effort to keep Russia militarily weak, and they will fear that NATO countries will back efforts to cause further disintegration of Russia.

This treatment is unfair. Russia is free because it had a peaceful, bloodless revolution to get rid of communism. The West withstood communism with military strength until the people under the Soviet regime, both in Eastern Europe and in Russia, discarded it. Russia freely relinquished Eastern Europe, and it chose democracy. The Russian people need our help to rebuild their country instead of having a military alliance, driven by lingering distrust and enmity, shoved closer to their border.

Much more importantly, from the view of naked self-interest, this treatment is almost pathologically foolhardy. Russia's conventional forces are virtually nonexistent. It has tenuous control over huge expanses of its territory, and faces internal and external challenges to that control. It has a weak democracy with strong totalitarian elements vying to retake control. It also still has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. Threatening and weakening Russia by expanding NATO, in our opinion, may result in part of that arsenal being used, in defense or to lash out, and could even lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange. Our colleagues, and our European allies, are trapped in a Cold War mentality. They are threatening Russia, and thereby further destabilizing it. The end result could be nuclear war. We believe that this treaty is extremely dangerous, and urge our colleagues to reject it.

Argument 2:

We agree with the above argument, and add that NATO and the United States' national security interests are being undermined by the new roles that the alliance is being asked to assume. NATO has succeeded because it has been a defensive alliance with a very clear, universally supported goal--survival. The need for providing that defense has almost entirely dissipated. Some threats still exist, and should be guarded against. However, now that the imminent threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared, President Clinton and some Members have tried, with some success, to change NATO's role into an international police "peacekeeping" force. It was not designed for that purpose, and there will always be policy differences among NATO members if this new purpose becomes its main mission. In its first 5 decades NATO never took part in military conflicts outside of its members' territories, though there were hundreds of such conflicts. Now, due to pressure from President Clinton, it is attempting to enforce a political settlement in Bosnia. Throughout the conflict in Bosnia the United States has definitely favored one side, and not all of its NATO allies have chosen the same side. The alliance has held together so far, but engaging in this type of conflict is bound to exacerbate tensions among allies and call into question the value of NATO. Many new-world-order types who would like to create an international, United Nations army to force countries to obey world edicts, but who have been unsuccessful in creating such an army, are no doubt pleased by this new role for NATO. As both a matter of principle and a matter of practicality we are not. As a matter of principle, we do not believe that the United States should appoint itself the policeman of the world, and browbeat its NATO allies into helping it enforce its decisions. As a practical matter, the American people will not provide the financial support necessary for it to take that role. President Clinton has gutted our defense forces, despite our yearly attempts to add back funding. At the same time, he has deployed them into conflicts around the globe at higher rates than at any time since World War II. The Bosnia mission alone, which is operating right now without congressional authorization, is using all of the United States' military capabilities in Europe. Our national security is being gravely weakened because we are spending so much money on conflicts that do not threaten our vital interests. As a result of our playing world policeman, our forces will be much weaker if we get into another conflict such as the Persian Gulf that genuinely threatens national security. The resolution before us could have expressly limited NATO's mission to its traditional, sole mission of defending Europe. It does not. In fact, it contains language that could be used to support NATO involvement in wars anywhere in the world. Our main concern is not that this treaty threatens Russia, but that it threatens national security by allowing NATO to mutate into an international "peacekeeping" force. We therefore oppose ratification.